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11/I. OBJECTIVES AND MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
One striking aspect of the U.S. economy's performance during the last
decade is the decline in the rate of return on corporate capital. The
potential significance of this "fact" is clear but its actual significance
is not. The decline may or may not indicate a basic structural shift in
the II.S. economy. It may reflect a serious weakness, a natural and benign
result of market forces, or something in between. Which interpretation is
is correct depends on several considerations, particularly the following:
1. Whether the decline is serious depends on the level from which it
starts. If the mid-1960s was a period of unusually high profitabil-
ity, then the subsequent decline may merely be a return to normal
levels.
2. The "trend's" importance depends on whether the cost of capital
has declined proportionally. If it has, then the falling rate of
return need not, in itself, be cause for concern.
We have attempted to clarify the issues posed by declining corporate
profitability over the last decade, to evaluate the evidence for longer-term
trends in profitability, and to provide additional evidence about causes and
consequences. Our essay is organized around two simple questions.
1. How have U.S. nonfinancialcorporations (NFCs) fared? We ask the same
questio question for manufacturing corporations (MCs) which are the major
subsector of NFCs.
2. How have rates of return on real capital held by NFCs and MCs behaved
relative to their respective capital costs?
We answer the first question by determining how well investors in NFCs and
Note: Footnotes and References appear on pages ,following the text.
2MCs have done. That is, we argue that the best measures of the performance
of the NFC and MC sectors are based on changes in the capital market's
aggregate valuation of the securities issued -by the firms in that sector.
We answer the second question by examining rates of return on the capital
stock of NFCs and MCs. Our analysis is directed towards the postwar period
from 1947 through 1979.
Our main conclusions are the following:
1. Nonfinancial corporations have fared poorly since the mid-1960s.
That fact is evident from the most casual examination of stock
market data, and it stands up to careful examination. On the other
hand, NFC performance in the postwar period ending in 1965 was
excellent.
2. When the market value of NFC securities is measured relative to the
net reproduction cost of real capital held by NFCs, the mid-1960s
is revealed as an unusually favorable period. However, today's market
values are not unusually low compared to values prevailing in, say,
the 1950s. Instead of asking why today's performance is poor, we
might better ask why performance in the early and mid-1960s was so good.
3. Rates of return on real capital show the same pattern as market
values: exceptional performance in the mid-1960s followed by a
decline to levels more typical of the early postwar period.
4. Real costs of capital seem to have been stable since about 1956.
Since then, fluctuations in the market value of nonfinancial
corporations have been much more closely related to changes in
operating profitability than to changes in capitalization rates.
The implication of our findings are discussed in the concluding section
of this essay. There we also note a number of areas for further research.
3II. INTRODUCTION
We are concerned with the rate of return on investments in the private
sector of the United States economy. To this end we examine the profitability
of nonfinancial corporations in the aggregate, and for a major subset
thereof--corporate manufacturing.
Although NFCs by no means account for the entire private sector, they
are the major part of it. More than half of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) originates in the NFC sector. NFCs account for more than 90 percent
of corporate GDP and more than 60 percent of total business GDP. The
replacement costs of plant, equipment and inventories held by NFCs now exceeds
$1.5 trillion. Thus, the past performance and current healty of this sector
is a matter of interest and concern. Similarly, MC investment in plant,
equipment and inventories currently is worth more than $500 billion.
NFCs encompass corporations engaged in a wide variety of economic
activities--manufacturing, construction, transportation, gas and electric
utilities, communications, retail and wholesale trade, etc. The Manufacturing
Corporation (MC) subsector is larger than any other, comprising about half
of the NFC total. For a number of the other countries involved in the rate
of return project, estimates of rates of return for all NFCs are not feasible;
estimates for the MC sector, however, can be undertaken in all countries
participating in our project.
It is a widely accepted fact (a fact that we reconfirm later in our paper)
that NFC and MC profitability, measured by the rate of return on corporate
assets, has fallen sharply since 1965. Is this evidence of relatively poor
performance conclusive and unambiguous? Not generally so. There are a number
of difficulties.
1. The rate of return on capital can be computed in countless ways. Some
indicate a more serious decline than others. The National Income Accounts
4provide several different estimates of depreciation, for example. Each
implies a different measure of income, a different value for net capital
stock, and a different rate of return.
2. What is to be included in capital stock? Most estimates for NFCs include
only the net replacement cost of inventory and physical capital
(buildings, machinery and equipment). Land is usually excluded; its
true value is extremely difficult to measure in any case. Net working
capital is frequently left out.
3. What about intangible assets? These include, for example, the extra
value of a going concern over a random collection of physical assets,
and the value of cumulative expenditures on research, marketing, and
employee training. The extra costs incurred in a period of learning-by-
doing are a relevant asset that is almost never shown on corporate
balance sheets. Firms acquire valuable investment opportunities by
2/
virtue of past activities.- Monopoly power is an asset from the investor's
viewpoint.
The difficulties implicit in these questions have absorbed many man-years
of study. Despite this work, problems remain; rates of return calculated
from accounting data will never be entirely free of errors of definition and
measurement. Of course these statistics are indispensable for many purposes.
But they are not ideally suited for determining how business forms faced
over the lest decade or some longer period.
There is a simple alternative. The value of the firm is not determined
by the cumulative funds invested in it, or by the net replacement cost of
its stock of real capital, but by the stream of earnings investors expect
it to generate. The value of this stream at any time can be observed directly
5by summing the market value of all of the firm's outstanding securities.
That is the true value of all the firm's assets. The income realized in
any particular period can be found by adding the cash payments received by
investors to the change in the market value of the firm's securities over
the period, computed net of any new issues of securities. The rate of
return earned by investors in that firm is found by dividing income by
start-of-period market value.
In short, we propose to answer the question, "How well have nonfinancial
corporations and manufacturing performed?" by using two bodies of data: the
measure of profitability derived by relating operating income to capital
stock, on the one hand, and the returns earned by investors on the qquity
and debt claims to corporate earnings, on the other.
There may be some resistance to the idea of using stock and bond values
to answer so fundamental a question. Many regard the stock market as
irrational, and therefore an untrusworthy source of information about
real phenomena. We believe such suspicions are unfounded.
Some make the elementary logical error of confusing volatility with
irrationality. There is no necessary connection. The stock market is a
major locus for risk-bearing. In our view the stock market's volatility
accurately reflects the high degree of uncertainty acutally existing in the
economy. In fact, we distrust accounting estimates of firm values precisely
because they are so stable.
Some doubts may stem from conceit, in the form of an individual's
belief that he or she has a more accurate assessment of value than capital
markets can provide. Often this belief is based on hindsight. The belief
is sus pect anyway, because so few professional investors--who are presumably
the most knowledgeable--have been able to outperform the market consistently.-
6Some doubts may reflect the inability to explain the day-to-day or
week-to-week movements of the stock market. Yet it is intellectual
arrogance to assume that something that cannot be explained is irrational
or meaningless. In any case, we are concerned not with short-term market
fluctuations, but with market behavior over a period of many years.
There is good evidence that capital markets are efficient, in the sense
4/of responding promptly and accuately to new ifomtion.- That is the main
reason why we use capital market data with confidence.
7III. RATES OF RETURN TO INVESTORS IN NONFINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS AND IN MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
Consider a portfolio containing all the debt and equity securities
issued by NFCs. That portfolio's aggregate market value, MV, is the market's
5'
estimate of the present vilue of the stream of future earnings- which
investors expect NFCs to generate.
An investment in this portfolio would have generated income in the form
of cash interest and dividend payments and also in the form of capital gains
and losses. Thus wecan calculate the rate of return earned by the portfolio
in the year t by estimating total income for year t and dividing by MVt'
the portfolio's market value at the start of the year. Let this rate of
6/
return be Rt *
Note that R is not the rate of return earned by NFC stockholders. We
are concerned with the performance of the entire NFC sector, not with the
7/
return received by holders of a claim on part of that sector's earnings.-
Stockholders may have gained at the expense of bondholders, or vice versa,
8/
but that is not relevant here.- It is also important that our profitability
measure be unaffected by shifts in capital structure over time.
8
Not all NFC securities are publicly traded. Even for
securities that are, price data are not always conveniently available.
(This is the case for most corporate bonds, f.or example.) Therefore it was
9/
necessary to work out a procedure for estimating MV and R . Of course
alternative procedures are possible, but we believe any careful estimates
will show the same patterns across time.
- Table 1 shows real (i.e., nominal R adjusted by the CPI) R s for
to t
various one- and four-year intervals between 1947 and 1979. The Rt s are
extremely volatile when measured annually. However, hindsight reveals a
10/
pattern.-- Investors in NFC and MC securities fared very well indeed after
World War II and up to about 1965, but poorly after that. The contrast
between the first and second halves of the 1960s is dramatic, particularly
when real rates of return are examined. The poor performance of the late
1960s continues into the 1970s. Table 1 shows that both nonfinancial
corporations and manufacturing corporations have earned, on average, negative
real rate of return from 1966 to 1979.
Figure 1 displays the returns in a different way. Suppose that at the
start of 1947 you had invested $1.00 in the portfolio of all bonds and stocks
issued by NFCs. That is, you started by owning a very small fraction of the
portfolio of all NFC securities, which in aggregate was worth MV 7. You
then followed a buy-and-hold strategy, reinvesting all dividends and interest.
The rate of growth in that investment's value indicates how well. or poorly
NFCs have fared and similarly for MCs.
Of course Figure 1 tells the same story as the right column of Table 1,
but is told in a way that may be easier to appreciate. Both nominal and
real values increased rapidly, with few interruptions, up to about 1965.
After that there was
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TABLE 1--ESTIMATED REAL RATES OF RETURN FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
AND ALL NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1947-79
(Shown in Percent)
Manufacturing All Nonfinancial
After-Tax Before-Tax After-Tax Before-Tax
Year Return to Return on Effective Return on Return to Return on Effective Return on
Investors Capital Tax Rate Capital Investors Capital Tax Rate Capital
(R) (ROC-BT) T (ROC-BT) (R) (ROC-AT) T (ROC-BT)
1947
48
49
1950
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
1960
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
1970
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
-0.3
-0.9
22.4
34.0
18.8
11.9 11.9
-0.5
58.2
30.8
7.5
-15.0
41.1
14.2
-6.6
23.4
-11.2
21.0
14.6
16.1
-12.0
27.8
5.6
-13.0
-4.9
11.0
14.4
-19.0
-21.2
26.1
16.1
-11.6
0.3
2.2
Four Year Averages
1947-50 13.8
51-54 22.1
55-58 16.1
59-62 7.8
63-66 9.9
67-70 3.9
71-74 -3.7
75-79 6.6
Average for the Period 1947-79
Mean 8.1 7
Standard
Deviation 17.8
9.1
11.2
10.6
9.6
8.5
7.6
6.8
6.3
9.0
7.3
6.7
5.3
7.9
6.9
6.9
8.6
9.8
10.9
13.0
12.3
10.7
9.6
7.7
5.5
6.6
7.5
7.2
4.1
5.1
6.0
6.2
5.7
4.4
10.1
7.3
7.1
7.6
11.5
8.4
6.4
5.5
50.4
41.8
36.9
54.6
60.9
55.7
59.0
54.4
51.8
52.8
51.2
50.1
48.9
49.0
48.5
44.3
43.7
41.4
40.0
41.5
38.7
43.9
45.6
43.4
41.7
41.6
44.5
52.0
41.6
45.5
45.4
47.6
50.1
45.9
57.5
51.5
47.7
41.7
42.9
45.0
46.0
47.2
.9
2.2 5,9
18.3
19.3
16.7
21.1
21.8
17.1
16.6.
13.8
18.6
15.4
13.8
10.6
15.5
13.6
13.3
15.5
17.5
18.6
21.6
21.0
17.4
17.2
14.2
9.7
11.3
12.8
12.9
8.6
'8.8
11.0
11.4
10.9
8.8
18.9
17.3
14.6
14.5
19.7
14.6
11.4
10.2
15.0
3.9
-4.4
-0.3
17.2
20.5
12.1
10.8
40.9
22.2
4.9
-5.4
36.3
10.3
-0.3
22.2
-8.0
16.9
13.2
10.3
-9.8
19.7
6.0
-12.7
-3.0
9.7
11.8
-19.0
-26.9
21.4
15.3
-7.4
-1.0
-0.2
8.3
16.1
14.5
6.1
7.7
2.5
-8.5
7.0
6.8
14.8
6.7
8.8
8.2
7.2
6.0
5.8
5.1
5.7
7.3
5.8
5.5
5.0
6.4
6.0
6.2
7.7
8.4
9.4
10.4
10.2
9.2
8.5
7.2
6.0
6.5
7.0
6.6
4.5
5.9
6.0
6.5
6.2
5.7
7.7
5.7
5.9
6.6
9.6
7.7
6.2
6.1
6.9
1.5
52.7
44.5
38.9
55.4
61.4
56.7
59.1
51.8
50.6
53.5
51.5
49.2
47.9
46.9
46.2
41.1
40.7
38. 1
36.9
37. 1
35.7
40.0
41.1
38.7
37.2
36.6
39.4
45.1
35.2
38.5
37.2
38.6
38.3
48.9
57.3
51.2
45.5
38.2
38.9
39.6
37.6
44.3
12.5
14.3
15.9
13.4
16.2
15.6
13.3
12.6
11.8
14.7
12.5
11.4
9.8
12.4
11.3
11.5
13.1
14.1
15.1
16.5
16.2
14.4
14.2
12.4
9.7
10.3
11.0
11.0
8.3
9.1
9.8
10.4
10.1
9.2
15.0
13.3
12.1
12.1
15.5
12.7
9.9
9.8
12.5
2.4
Return to Investors
from the beginning
Annual returns are weighted averages of return on debt and equity held
to the end of the
Price Index. Equity returns include
of interest and capital gains.
year, adjusted for the annual change in the Consumer
both dividends and capital gains; debt returns consist
Return on Capital (ROC). The before-tax rate of return is the ratio of (1) before tax
operating income of nonfinancial and manufacturing corporations, to (2) the net replacement
cost of inventory, plant and equipment of nonfinancial and manufacturing corporations.
T
Definitions:
A Figure 1: VALUE OF PORTFOLIO OF NFC SECURITIES - BUY AND HOLD INVESTMENT STRATEGY
Portfolio Value
in Dollars. End of
Year (log scale)
20.00 - Nominal
Value
15.00 -
10.00
7.00 Real
Value
5.00
4.00
3.00 -
2.00
1.00
1946 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 Year
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slower and more erratic growth in the portfolio's nominal value. Its
real value has grown hardly at all since 1965.
Aggregate Market Value of NFC and MC Securities
Most of the volatility of the rates of return reflect capital gains or
losses: that is, changes in 14Vt, the aggregate market value of NFC securities.
We are also concerned with the level of MV . Of course we expect MVt to
increase over time as corporations grow. Therefore we express MVt relative to
the stock of corporate capital which we define as the net replacement cost of
NFC depreciable capital and inventory, expressed in current dollars.- This
adjusts for that part of the movement in MVt caused by inflation and expansion
in the scale of NFC operations.
The ratio of market value to net replacement cost of plant, equipment and
inventory is usually referred to as "Tobin's q."2 This ratio is shown in
Table 2 and is plotted in Figure 2 for 1947-1979, for NFCs and MCs.
A value of q = 1.0 means that the market value of the earnings stream
generated by NFC assets is exactly equal to the net replacement cost of those
assets. This is the value for q we expect to observe if the economy is in
long-run equilibrium, if the definition of CSt includes all income-producing
assets, and if MVt and CSt are measured without error. (Incidentally, this is
the value that annual q's averaged in the post-war period both for NCFs and
MCs. See Table 2.) Recognizing these ifs, we should not read too much
significance into the absolute value of q in any year. It is nevertheless
odd to find q so far below 1.0 in the early post-war period and currently. If
the estimates are anywhere near correct, it was far cheaper in the decade
following the war and in the last five years for firms to add capacity by
purchasing other firms, than by buying fresh plant, equipment and inventory.
In 1953, for example, it was possible to purchase an "average NFC firm" for
only 70 percent of the net replacement cost of its assets; while the "average
MC corporation could be bought for 58 percent of what its assets were worth.
TABLE-2
q, CAPITALIZATION RATE (p), AND MARKET VALUE DEBT RATIO
FOR MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS AND ALL NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS, 1947-79
Manufacturing All Nonfinancial
Capitali- Adjusted Market Value Capitali- MarketValue
zation Rate Standard Standard Debt Ratio, zation Rate Standard Debt Ratio,
Year q (p)a Deviationb Deviationb (Midyear) q (p)a Deviation (Midyear)
1947
48
49
1950
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
1960
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
1970
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
.78
79
0.83
0.55
0.59
0.64
0.65
0.62
0.58
0.80
0.95
0.91
0.72
0.95
1.16
1.06
1.19
1.12
1.30
1.52
1.81
1.41
1.59
1.63
1.29
1.12
1.15
1.26
0.83
0.36
0.66
0.69
0.61
0.56
0.48
Four Year Averages
1947-50 0.65
51-54 0.66
55-58 0.88
59-62 1.13
63-66 1.51
67-70 1.41
71-74 0.90
75-79 0.75
10.95
20.58
17.99
14.92
13.07
12.19
11.83
7.91
9..43
7.97
9.40
5.54
6.84
6.54
5.77
7.71
7.57
7.18
7.18
8.69
6.70
5.88
6.00
4.93
5.77
5.95
8.57
11.54
7.75
8.67
10.17
10.22
9.14
16.1
11.3
8.1
6.7
7.7
5.9
8.0
9.2
-. 02
-. 01
-. 01
-. 07
-. 04
.. 00
.00
.01
-. 01
.00
.02
.04
.03
.03
.04
.15
.04
.04
.05
.09
.09
.09
.14
.17
.17
.16
.27
.56
.23
.20
.26
.26
.28
-. 03
-. 01
.01
.04
.06
.12
.29
.25
Average for the Period 1947-79
Mean 0.96 9.1
standard
Devia-
tion 0.38 3.5
0.97
0.86
0.68
0.79
0.78
0.76
0.70
0.76
1.03
0.99
0.90
0.88
1.13
1.07
1.18
1.07
1.28
1.39
1.39
1.37
1.43
1.34
1.17
0.91
1.06
1.16
1.08
0.86
0.78
0.85.
0.71
0.62
0.59
0.83
0.75
0.95
1.11
1.36
1.21
1.04
0.71
7.5
10.5
12.0
9.1
8.4
7.7
7.4
7.4
7.2
6.1
6.2
5.6
5.8
5.7
5.2
7.3
6.6
6.8
7.7
7.7
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.7
6.2
6.1
6.3
5.7
7.7
7.3
9.4
10.4
10.0
.17
.19
.24
-19
-19
-19
.19
.22
.17
.16
.16
.19
.16
.17
.17
.22
.19
.20
.20
.20
.19
.18
.22
.29
.25
.24
.30
.38
.33
.31
.35
.38
.38
9.8
7.7
6.3
6.0
7.2
6.6
6.1
9.0
0.20
0.20
0.17
0.18
0.20
0.22
0.29
0.35
0.98 7.4
0.24 1.6
Definitions: _q. The ratio of the total market value of nonfinancial corporations
corporations to their net plant and equipment and inventories valued
cost.
and manufacturing
at replacement
Capitalization Rate (p). The ratio of operating income, i.e., profits plus interest,
to the total market value of nonfinancial corporations and manufacturing corporations.
Market Value Debt Ratio. The ratio of the market value of debt to the market value
of debt plus equity for nonfinancial and manufacturing corporations.
f~.
Figure 2: RATIO OF AGGREGATE MARKET VALUE OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS TO
THE NET REPLACEMENT COST OF FIXED CAPITAL STOCK, INVENTORY AND
OTHER ASSETS (q), 1946-76
1.5 -
1.4 -
1.3 -
1.2 -
1.1 --
1.0
.9 -
.8
.7 -
.6
.54 8
1946 48 50I
On Standard
Base
On Augmented
Base
I . I . I i I .1 . I . I * I , I I * I I I
52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 -74 76 Year
I
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Over the post-war period q traced out a long cycle, using from below
1.0 to well above it by the mid-sixties when it peaked; since then, it has
followed an erratic downward course to its current. values below 1.0. The
high rates of return earned by investors in NFC securities over the 1947-1955
period can be largely attributed to the recovery of q to more "reasonable"
levels.
Note finally, the greater validity of q for manufacturing. NFCs and '1Cs
have the same average q over the post-war period, but the standard deviation
is larger for MCs' q.
Interpreting q
Despite its interest and usefulness q is easy to misinterpret. Of
course, there are problems of aggregation: the q for all NFCs hides sub-
stantial inter-industry and interfirm variation. There are also difficult
problems of measurement and definition.
Consider for example, the following statement from the 1977 Economic
13/
Report of the President:-
If.....assets are valued in the market significantly above their
replacement cost, corporations will be encouraged to invest in new
equipment and thereby create capital gains for the owners of their
securities.
Properly interpreted this statement is correct, but it is nevertheless
ambiguous if taken literally.
Consider how the level of an individual firm's q affects the firm's
rate of investment. Figure 3a portrays the investment decision: the firm
invests to increase capacity until V, the present value of forecasted net
cash flows generated by an additional machine, declines to C, the cost per
machine. Since all but the last machine have positive net present values,
(V - C > 0), the firm's q exceeds one. But the net present. value of the
15
Dollars Figure-3a: The Firm's Investment Decision
Caoacity
(Number of Machines)
Dollars Figure 3b:"Effects of an Increase
in q on Investment in Physical Capital
16
marginal machine is zero. That is, the marginal q equals exactly l.C. The
quotation cited could be misinterpreted as a prediction that firms will
continue investing so long as the average q (which is what we observe) is
greater than one.
It is true that both the average and the marginal q equal one in a long-
run equilibrium. If all industries are competitive, and if the denominator
of q correctly measures the value of all assets, including intangible ones,
then any opportunities to make investments having positive net present
values must last only for the short-run. In this sense it is true to say
that a q greater than one for some firms implies profitable investment
opportunities for others.
On the other hand, an entrenched, profit-maximizing monopolist would
have a continuing supply of positive net present value investments, and
therefore would have a q greater than one even in long-run equilibrium.
But not every firm with a high measured q is a monopolist: intangible assets,
such as value created by expenditures on research and development or
advertising outlays, are reflected in the numerator but not the denominator
14/
of q. The observed q for such firms is overstated.-
The quotation we cited would be unambiguously correct if it referred
not to the level of q, but to a rise in that level. An increase in q should
predict an increase in the rate of investment. Consider a firm starting
at the optimal capacity level as determined by V = C. In Figure 3b, the
investment opportunity schedule shifts up to V1, thus increasing q. Invest-
ment increases in response, lifting capacity to a new equilibrium above the
initial level 1.
The actual adjustment might occur in a number of ways. If C, the cost
17
per machine, is constant, the firm moves directly- to 2, perhaps with a delay.
It is perhaps more realistic to assume that the firm faces and upward-
sloping cost curve C' in the short run, with the steepness of the curve
depending on the speed of adjustment. Still another possibility is that
producers of machineswill, at least in the.short run, capture some of
the excess profits created by the upward shift in V. This gives a cost curve
C" and the equilibrium position 4.
But we can say the following regardless of the adjustment mechanism:
because q reflects the expected profitabiliy of corporate investment relative
to the opportunity cost of capital, an increase in q should signal increased
15/
corporate investment.
We have assumed in all of this that the denominator would always be
determined by the initial cost level C. The adjustment costs in C' would not
be picked up in capital stock as measured in the National Income Accounts,
although one could argue that they should be. For example, if firms face
adjustment costs, then the true secondhand value of all machines at the time
of Figure 3b is not C, but C' at capacity level 3. Nor would the National
Income Accounts pick up a short-run increase in costs to C". The denominator
as we measure it has to be thought of as a long-run net replacement cost,
given current prices and technology. It probably does not adequately reflect
year-to-year changes in the marginal cost of adding new capacity.
Conclusions
The first 20 postwar years were a generally favorable period for NFCs
and MCs. Investors in NFC and MC securities earned average rates of return
on market value that seem, in hindsight, to be unusually generous.
Starting in 1947
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TABLE 3
THE SPREAD BETWEEN ROCs BEFORE AND AFTER TAX,
FOR NFCs AND MCs, 1947-79
Period ROC-BT ROC-AT ROC-BT ROC-BT ROC-AT ROC-BT
1941-50 15.0 7.7 0.51 18.8 10.1 0.54
51-54 13.3 5.7 0.43 17.3 7.3 0.42
55-58 12.1 5.9 0.49 14.6 7.1 0.49
59-62 12.1 6.6 0.55 14.5 7.6 0.52
63-66 15.5 9.6 0.62 19.7 11.5 0.58
67-70 12.7 7.7 0.63 14.6 8.4 0.58
71-74 9.9 6.2 0.63 11.4 6.4 0.56
75-79 9.8 6.1 0.62 10.2 5.5 0.54
Mean 1947-79 12.5 6.9 0.55 15.0 7.9 0.55
Source: Table 1
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the aggregate market value of stocks and bonds which was about equal to
the replacement cost of NCF inventories, plant and equipment, and about
4/5 of the replacement cost of their physical assets for MCs tended to
drift down in relatively through the 1950s. A sharp relative
rise in market value started in 1959. By 1965, aggregate market value was
50 percent larger than a greatly expanded base of inventory and real assets;
for MCs the corresponding figure was even higher.
Of course we do not know why this all happened. Values observed in
capital markets show us only the end result of a.complicated process.
Insights into earlier states of the process must come from other measures
of profitability.
While q for NFCs and MCs moved synchronously over the period, it was
more volatile for MCs, rising more rapidly and falling more rapidly than
for NFCs.
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IV. RATES OF RETURN ON CAPITAL.STOCK
In this section we examine NFC profitability from a different point
of view. In Section II we derived estimates of income and value from
capital market data. The estimates in this section are based on annual
measures of asset value 'and operating income developed by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce as part of the National Income
and Product Accounts (NIPA). In effect we are moving from capital market
measures of return to measures closer to the book or accounting measures
utilized by business firms.
The capital market measures are sufficient to tell us how well NFCs
have fared, but they give no clue to the reasons for good or bad performance.
For example, we have no way of inferring from market value data whether the
period of unusually high market values in the mid-1960s was due to high
operating profits, to low capitalization rates for NFC securities, or to a
combination of both. The interpretation of capital market data requires
information from other sources.
Many measures of rate of return can be derived from NIPA data. The
one we emphasize most is the rate of return on capital stock (ROC), defined
as the ratio of NFC operating income, i.e., profits plus interest, to the
net replacement cost of NFC depreciable capital stock and inventories. Our
estimates are based on newly revised series prepared by the Bureau of
16/
Economic Analysis.-
The numerator of our ROC is the sum of profits and net interest paid.
In the determination of profits, depreciation and the cost of replacing
inventory are both estimated at current year's prices. The denominator--
plant equipment and inventories--is estimated at replacement cost. Their
ratio, therefore, is a real rate of return.
ROC Figure 4: RATE OF RETURN ON NFC CAPITAL STOCK, 1946-76(Percent).
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Thus following other investigators, we interpret ROC as the real rate
of return on NFC capital stock. Of course, such an interpretation rests on
a number of assumptions, some of which are not strictly true. Firms must
invest in other assets besides inventories and plant and equipment, for example.
(Later in this section we examine ROC computed on an "augmented" investment
base.) Also, operating income equals real income only if there are no real
holding gains on capital stock and inventories rise at exactly the same rate
as prices generally. (Again, later in this section, we adjust ROC for holding
gains or losses.)
Nevertheless, operating income is an important indicator of corporate
performance and a decent first approximation of real operating income.
Moreover, our conclusions are insensitive to the exact definition of income
or ROC.
Before-Tax Rates of Return
Table 1 presents before-tax ROCs for the NFC and MC sectors for the
period 1947-1979. They are plotted in Figure 4.
For both NFCs and MCs three distinct periods can be noted in the post-
war results. From 1947 through 1970, the before-tax ROC tended to decline,
but with sharp year-to-year fluctuations. For NFCs it averaged 13.2 percent,
for MCs, 16.6 percent. There was an upward burst of profitability in the
first half of the 1960s and a decline in the second half. The ave.rage for
the period 1961-1969 was 14.2 percent for NFC and 17.4 for MCs. Finally
for the most recent period 1970-1979, ROC averaged 9.9 percent for NFCs
and 10.6 for MCs, noticeably lower than the other two periods.
The same pattern over time is evident in the four-year averages in
the Table.
23
Was the decline from the peak of the mid-1960s so sharp as to carry the
before-tax ROCs to a new low level? It appears so. But this result cannot
be vigorously defended. It is based on a short run of years, and may'be
a transitory or cyclical phenomenon. Later in this section we make a more
careful attempt to extract the trend, if there is any, from the before-tax ROCs.
After-Tax Rates of Return
Table 1 also presents after-tax ROCs. The after-tax ROC differs from
its before-tax counterpart only in that corporate income taxes are subtracted
from operating income.
It is after-tax income that counts in the determination of security
prices. The after-tax ROC is the "book" counterpart to R (discussed in an
earlier section),.the market rate of return on all NFC securities.
The after-tax ROC is perhaps more pertinent than its before-tax counter-
part as evidence in the current debate on profitability. It measures the
actual reward to suppliers of capital (before personal income tax) or, as
some view it, the amount available to finance new investment. Has the after-
tax ROC tended to decline?
The three episodes observed for the before-tax ROC also characterize
the after-tax figure. For NFCs there were wide fluctuations around a mean
of 6.4 percent from 1947-1960, then a sharp rise and fall in the 1960s,
averaging 8.6 percent. The average was only 6.1 percent for the period
17/
1970-79.- For MCs over the same three periods, the ROC(AT) averaged
8.1, 9.9, and 5.8.
Are the low after-tax ROCs for the most recent decade unique? The
-averages seem to suggest that they are not for NFCs since even lower values
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were found for 1951-1958. For MCs, however, the most recent experience
seems out of line with the historical record. We explore this more
carefully in a later section.
A noteworthy feature of the postwar record of profitability both for
NFCs and MCs and on both a before- and after-tax basis is the unusually
high rate of return in the 60s. It could well be that what really requires
explanation is not the unusually low profitability of the last decade,
but the extraordinarily profitable experience of the 60s.
Note also that rate of return in the 60's compared with the plans
that preceeded and followed, was relatively higher for the ROC after tax,
particularly for NFCs.
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V. CORPORATE INCOME TAXES
In Table 3 we compare ROCs before-and-after tax for NFCs and MCs. For
MCs there is a slight tendency for the ROC-AT to rise relative to the ROC-BT.
For NFCs a narrowing of the gap between before-and-after tax ROCs from the
60s on is more pronounced.
The narrowing spread between before-and-after tax ROCs since the end
of the War is due to a downward drift in effective corporate tax rates.
Although legislated rates of the Federal Corporation income tax (by far the
largest component of NFC income tax liability) were substantially the same
from 1951 and state corporation income tax rates moved up over these years,
the effective tax rate particularly on NFC operating income has tended to
decline (see the Effective Tax Rate columns of Table 1). Effective rates
started to move down in the early 1960s, and the decline has tended to
persist, although not without interruption.
Note that our effective tax rate measures tax liability as a fraction of
operating income, i.e. real profits plus interest. But the corporation income
tax base is nominal profits.
Some of the decline in effective rates is due to purposeful government
policies, for example the introduction of accelerated depreciation, the
tendency to shorten depreciable lives for tax purposes, permitting LIFO
inventory accounting for tax purposes, and the investment tax credit. But
the major part of the decline of effective rates in recent years reflects
financing policy and rising nominal interest rates. The Market Value
Debt Ratio Columns of Table 2 suggest that a major reason for the differentially
heavier decline in effective rates for NFCs than MCs lies in the greater
reliance of NFCs on debt finance.
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Although the effective tax rate has drifted downward in the postwar
period, that trend is only part of the story. Bursts of inflation have sent
corporate income tax liabilities up and after-tax profitability down. The
results for 1974 are particularly dramatic. Hankin has found a significant
negative correlation in the post-war period between the after-tax ROC and
the rate of inflation, after adjustment for a time trend and the rate of
change in GNP. There was a strong positive link between inflation and the
effective tax rate, but no significant association between inflation and
18/
before-tax ROCT~ We explore all this more carefully in a regression analysis
presented in the next section.
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Comparing MCs and NFCs
With respect to the estimated variables displayed in Tables 1 and 2--
Returns to Investors, ROCs before and after tax, q, the capitalization rate
(p), and effective tax rates--the pattern over time is similar for MCs and
NFCs. The similarities of the time series for MCs and NFCs are more
striking than the differences. This suggestion that a common set of forces
are responsible for the outcomes for NFCs and MCs is reinforced by the simi-
-larity of the results of our regression analyses.
While their experience has been generally similar, we can observe
differences between MCs and NFCs. The most obvious one is that MCs seem
to have been more profitable. As shown in Table 4 the before-tax ROCs are
consistently higher for MCs than NFCs. The absolute difference between the
two peaked at over 4 percentage points from 1963-66, and reached its minimum
most recently--1975-79--at four-tenths of a percentage point. MCs also
had higher after-tax ROCs until very recently, but the difference between
MC and NFC has tended to convergence,: reflecting the heavier effective tax
rates on MCs.
The higher profitability of MCs also shows up in higher average returns
to investors, not in q, on average.
One possible explanation for higher returns is higher risks. The
evidence we have favors that explanation. We note (see Table 2) that the
MCs' standard deviations are a bit higher than the NFCs' except in the 1970s.
The MCs' before-and-after tax ROCs are more variable, and more sensitive to
the state of economic activity and the pace of inflation (see Table 3).
MCs waxed fatter in the mid-1960s and suffered more in the 1974 crunch.
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TABLE 4
A COMPARISON OF ROCs--BEFORE AND AFTER TAX--FOR MCs AND NFCs, 1947-79
ROC - Before Tax %
NFC MC-NFC MC/NFC
15.0
13.3
12.1
12.1
15.5
12.7
9.9
9.8
15.0 12.5
3.9
4.0
2.5
2.4
4.2
1.9
1.5
0.4
2.5
1.26
1.30
1.21
1.20
1.27
1.15
1.15
1.04
1.20
ROC - After Tax
MC NFC MC-NFC MC/NFC
10.1 7.7 2.4 1.31
7.3 5.7 1.6 1.28
7.1 5.9 1.2 1.20
7.6 6.6 1.0 1.15
11.5 9.6 1.9 1.20
8.4 7.7 0.7 1.09
6.4 6.2 0.2 1.03
5.5 6.1 -0.6 0.92
7.9 6.8 1.1 1.16
Source: Table 1
MC
18.9
17.3
14.6
14.5
19.7
14.6
11.4
10.2
Period
1947-50
51-54
55-58
59-62
63-66
67-70
71-74
75-79
Average
1947-79
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The lower debt ratio for MCs may be lenders' and managers' response to higher
business risk. Similar q's for MCs and NFCs, on average, despite higher MC
profitability, may reflect the greater volatility of the ROC for MCs.
Finally, capitalization rates for MCs are generally higher than for NFCs.
Greater risks ought to mean higher capitalization rates, other things equal.
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VI Searching for Trends
With respect to ROCs our study, and a number of others follow the framework
developed in an earlier paper by Nordhaus. He concluded that the return
on capital in the postwar period (1948-70) showed "a definite downtrend from
1948 to the middle 1950s, a dramatic recovery from the late 1950s to the
,19/
mid 1960s and a deterioration to a plateau by 1970."-- Nordhaus interpreted
the behavior of the ROC time series -as, a -postwar downtrend in corporate
20/profitability, reflecting a steady decline in the opportunity cost of capital.--
21/
This is not so clear to us. Inspection of Table 1 and its accompanying
chart suggests that for NFCs the ROC is most appropriate interpreted as an
irregular cyclical series. Note, for example, that while the after-tax
ROCs for NFCs from 1970 on were "low" relative to the average for the whole
period, in earlier sub-periods 1951-4 and 1955-58, the after-tax ROC was even
lower. As we have noted, the real outlyer which requires explanation are
the unusually high returns for 1963-66, averaging 9.6. The ROC before-tax
for NFCs also is most appropriately'interpreted as a cyclical series over
most of the postwar period. But, here, visual inspection suggests that
the last decade is distinctly below the range of values in earlier years.
The "visual impression" story is much the same for the ROC for Manu-
facturing Corporations. The after-tax ROC is a cyclical series, but here
the last 10 years do average out lower than other sub-periods. And the same
is true of the before-tax series.
"Visual inspection" of the data leads us to doubt a secular downtrend
in the after-tax ROC over the period 1947-79, and to suspect a declining
trend for the before-tax ROC. But it is difficult to "see" a downward
drift (or lack thereof), if it existed, given the volatility and cyclicity
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of the ROC time series.
We could "see" a trend (if any) more clearly if the ROC series were
adjusted for the factors, other than time, that affect corporate profit-
ability. To this end we have undertaken a set-of statistical tests, reported
22/in Tables 5 and 6, which draw on recent work by Roger Hankin.--
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TABLE 5
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL (ROC) -
AFTER TAX FOR ALL NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1947-79
Variable
Constant
Equation Term. Time
Level of Econo-a
mic Activity bInflation c 2Dummy R_
Panel A - Nonfinancial Corporations
7.62 -0.04
(3.94) (-0.47)
6.55 -0.02
(-0.24)
4.53 0.10
2.42 (1.28)
-- 0.16
(2.25)
0.15.
(3.57)
0.17
(4.76)
0.17
(4.67)
-0.19
(-3.85)
-0.20
(-4.15)
-1.41
(-1.96)
.01
.31
.55
.60
Panel B - Manufacturing Corporations
10.38
(4.21)
-0.14
(-1.32)
8.65 -0.12
(2.77) (-0.97)
6.31 0.03
(2.62) .(0.25)
5.70 0.11
(3.21) (1.22)
0.27
(5.03)
0.29
(6.17)
0.28
(6.13)
-0.2.2
(-3.39)
-0.23
(-3.75)
-1.96
(-2.10)
.02
.45
.59
.68
Note: t statistics appear in parentheses under the coefficients; values
of 2 or more indicate significance. Equations fitted by standard
Cochrane-Orcut procedure.
a Annual percentage change in real GNP.
b Annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index.
c Equals zero for all years 1947-69, and one in each year from 1970 to 1979.
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
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TABLE 6
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL (ROC) -
BEFORE TAX FOR ALL NONFINANCIAL CORPORATIONS
AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS, 1947-79
Variable
Constant
Equation Term Time mic Activity Inflationb
c 2Dummy R_
15.35
(8.98)
12.72
(5.39)
12.80
(4.88)
Panel A - Nonfinancial Corporations
-0.17
(-2.08)
-0.12
-0.13
(-1.19)
-0.04
(-0.44)
0.37
(9.29)
0.37
(9.29)
0.36
(9.08)
0.01
(0.16)
-0.01
(-0.15)
Panel B - Manufacturing Corporations
20.11
(8.20)
-0.30
(-2.56)
16.23 -0.24
(5.45) (-1.96)
16.76 -0.28
(4.58) (-1.81)
15.09 -0.12
(6.65) (-1.03)
0.63
(9.59)
0.62
(9.45)
0.61
(9.39)
0.06
(0.65)
0.03
(0.30)
Note: t statistics appear in parentheses under the coefficients; values
of 2 or more indicate significance. Equations fitted by standard
Cochrane-Orcut prodedure.
a Annual percentage in real GNP.
b Annual percentage change in Consumer Price Index.
C Equals zero for all years 1947-69, and one in each year from 1970 to 1979.
1
2
3
4
.13
.76
.79-1.85
(-2.28)
1
2
3
4
.15
.76
.75
.81-2.96
(-2.27)
aL l of Econo-
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Lines 1 through 3 of Tables 5 and 6 report the results of successively
regressing the after-tax ROC on time, then on time and annual percentage
changes in GNP, and finally on time, annual percentage changes in GNP, and
the inflation rate.- The change in GNP variable corrects for business cycle
effects, and the rate of price change variable adjusts for inflation,
correcting mainly for the impact of inflation on effective corporation income
tax rates.
In Table 5, which summarizes the results for the ROC after tax, NFCs
are covered in Panel A, MCs in Panel B.
The first equation of both Panels in Table 5 is the equivalent of a
simple time trend. For both NFCs and MCs as a function of time alone, the
after-tax ROC trended downward. But the equation "explains" virtually none
of the variability in the ROC, and the coefficient is not significant. In
the second equation, the ROC is related to time and the state of economic
activity. The latter emerges as a significant explanatory factor, and time
becomes less important. The third equation .adds the rate of inflation.
Inflation, too, turns out to be an important and significant determinant.
The more rapid the rate of inflation, other things equal, the lower the
after-tax ROC. Inflation exercises its effect primarily through the effective
tax rate. (Note in Table 6 that the rate of inflation has no effect on the
before-tax ROC.)
In the third equation of Panel A and B the time coefficient is positive.
Adjusting for the state of economic activity and the rate of inflation, the
postwar trend of after-tax ROC is slightly but insignificantly upward. The
trend is still more strongly positive in the fourth equation, in which a
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dummy variable licks up the low ROCs experienced in the 1970s.
We conclude that the after-tax ROC shows neither a downward nor an
upward trend. Variations around its central tendency can be explained, in
large part, by the changes in the level of economic activity and in the
23/
rate of inflation.-- Both these variables seem to have a stronger effect
on the after-tax ROC for manufacturing corporations than for all NFCs.
Perhaps we should search not for long-term trends but also for sudden
shifts in profitability. The economy of the 1970s may be fundamentally
different than before. The poor profitability record of the last
ten. years is not fully explained by a slack economy and brisk inflation.
The dummy variable for 1970-79 indicates that average ROC during this period
was 1.4 percentage points and almost 2 percentage points lower than before
for NFCs and MCs respectively, even after adjustment for inflation and the
rate of growth of GNP. The coefficient of the dummy variable is statistically
significant.
There has been a downward shift in profitability, bur our fourth equation
does not prove it is permanent. We could have fitted dummy variables to
other subperiods--the mid-1960s for example--and no doubt we could have
obtained significant coefficients, particularly as the periods of abnormally
high or low profitability can be picked by hindsight. None of these previous
episodes was a permanent shift.
Our equations explaining ROC are effective but crude. Profitability
responds to more than just inflation and the growth of GNP. Evidently these
omitted variables have been unfavorable in the 1970s. We have no way of
knowing whether they will continue unfavorable, 
-but we are inclined towards
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the longer view, and towards guessing that economists in 1987 will regard
the first half of the 1970s as an unfortunate but transient period. 2 4
A similar explantory exercise for the before-tax ROC is summarized in
Table 6. With respect to time alone, the trend seems downward and is
significant. However after adjusting for the other factors, the influence
of time alone is less strongly negative and is insignificant. But there
remains a "suggestion" for MCs that there has been a downward trend, since
the time variable in equations 2 and 3 border on significance. In contrast
with the ROC(AT), inflation is neither an important nor a significant
determinant of the ROC(BT). Hence our conclusion is that inflation
exercises its effect through an increase in corporate income tax liability.
With respect to declining trends in the before-tax ROC, we choose the
option open to Scottish juries: "not proven."-- But we hold this view
more strongly for NFCs than for MCs.
Additional Notes on the Regressions
1. What results from the Cochrane-Orcutt iterative procedure can depend im-
portantly on the starting year. Therefore we ran the regressions in Tables 5 and 6
for NFCs also for 1946-79 and 1948-49. The coefficients and R2 were virtually
identical for all three runs.
2. For the pace of inflation we also tried the GDP deflator which shows
a lower rate of price increase than the CPI. With the GDP deflator the results
were substantially the same as reported in the Tables but inflation "explained"
somewhat less of the variability of the after-tax ROC.
3. We tried an economically more meaningful specification for the Dummy
variable in equations 5 and 6 restricting it to the period from 1974-1979 on the
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presumption that the sharp rise in the price of energy following the formation
of OPEC in 1974 could have made the capital stock, laid down with much lower
prices of energy the expectation, "inefficient" with adverse effects on the
ROC. Under this alternative specification the coefficient on the Dummy
variable is lower and not significant.
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VII Some Further Observations on ROCs
1. The reader we are sure will have been properly impressed with the
limitations of and pitfalls in our estimates of returns to corporate invest-
ment and investors in corporations. In addition to all the caveats and
cautions we have flagged every reader will bring his own reservations and
concerns.
It is comforting to point out, therefore, that the numbers we have
generated meet a basic test of logical consistency. Over the long pull
(neglecting the special growth opportunities which may, in fact, be offset
by negative counterparts in the aggregate) we would expect that investors
in corporations would earn at a rate just about the same as what corporations
earn on their investments. And that is just what our estimates show for
the 33-year period they cover. Investors in NFCs averaged 8.1 percent over
the period; the corporations they invested in earned 7.9 percent on their
investments after meeting the prior claims of government. For NFCs our
estimates show a long-period average return (after tax) of 6.9 percent on
corporate investment and 6.8 percent on investments in the stocks and bonds
of these corporations.
The congruence of these estimates of investor and corporate returns
leads us to think that we must be doing something right.
2. Manufacturing seems to have taken a deeper profitability bath than
NFCs in the last decade. We have not yet analyzed the reasons for this.
One possibility that deserves careful exploration is that profitability in
manufacturing more than the rest of the industries making up NFCs has been
driven down by increasingly effective international competition. Simply to
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list the industries under manufacturing--chemicals, petroleum products, motor
vehicles, primary metal products, fabricated metal products, etc.--and
then to compare them with the rest of NFCs--wholesale and retail trade,
transportation, communication, electric, gas and sanitary services, construc-
tion, etc.--is strongly suggestive of different degrees of competition
effective for the manufacturing sector, caught up in international competition,
and the non-manufacturing nonfinancial.corporations producing primarily for
the home market.
3. If our estimates for NFCs were entirely accurate, and if our
estimates for MCs were likewise we could, by subtraction, derive the non-
manufacturing nonfinancial sector. But as we have noted frequently throughout
our paper orders of accuracy that would permit this do not characterize
our estimates. However, our estimates strongly suggest that two components
that make up the nonfinancial corporate sector--manufacturing and non-
manufacturing--are very different with respect to levels of profitability,
effective tax rates, capitalization rates, etc.
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VIII The Link Between Real and Financial Markets
Introduction
We have now examined both physical asset and financial asset measures
of NFC and MC performance. To a great extent they tell the same story. But
further insights depend on a link up of the physical and financial sectors.
The most important specific issue is how real rates of return on corporate
investment have behaved relatP. i .E' 1 costs.
It is difficult to measure .ortunity cost of capital directly,
because it is defined in terms olfexp.cLed returns on debt and equity secur-
26/
ities. There is no simple way to infer expectations from historical returns.-
But estimates of q can provide useful insights into whether the rate
of return on corporate capital has declined relative to the cost of capital,
which we denote as p. If, for example, we observe that q has declined,
27/
then we can infer that ROC has declined relative to p.- Moreover, we can
say this with reasonable confidence, since the market value of equity and
debt and the current value of plant, equipment, and inventories the determinants
of q are liable to less serious measurement errors than ROC or p.
We cannot use q to derive specific estimates of the rates of return
or the cost of capital for any particular year. But the approach should
permit us to identify changes in the spread between present and anticipated
future profitability, on the one hand, and capital costs on the other. We
believe this is the more relevant comparison. For example, it bears directly
on the concern that the falling rate of return reduces the incentive to
invest.
To summarize, changes in q over time for the NFC and MC sectors should
provide a clear measure of how present and anticipated rates of return on
41
real capital have behaved relative to the cost of capital.
The Behavior of q and ROC over Time
The time series of qt for nonfinancial coporations and manufacturing
corporations are presented and discussed in an earlier section. We note again
that the early and mid-1950s were an unfavorable period relative to the mid-
1960s, and that q has declined since the late 1960s.
Now, declining profitability does not depress stock- and bond market
values if capital costs decline proportionally. q depends not on ROC alone,
but on the ratio of ROC to p. Therefore we interpret the last decade's down-
trend in q as reflecting a decline in the rate of return earned by NFCs
relative to the NFC opportunity cost of capital.
It is difficult to separate the effects of ROC and p on q, because we
lack a reliable estimate of p. We can obtain a simple, rough measure, however.
In Table 2 we show the ratio of NFC and MC operating income to market value
for the period 1947-79 presented as a percentage. This ratio can be thought
of as a generalized earnings-price ratio where "price" equals the market
value of equity and debt and "earnings" equals real operating income.-
There is no evident trend in this ratio since the mid-1950s, and its volatility
since then has been much less than in the first postwar decade. (See Figure 5.)
If we can take the ratio as a rough estimate of p, we must conclude that
for NFCs that p declined steadily from its postwar peak in the late 1940s
But since 1956 it has fluctuated in a range from five to seven percent,
which matches the average after-tax ROCs over the postwar period and over the
past 20 years. Our data strongly suggest that it is these fluctuations
that account for the fluctuations in q over the last 20 years. As Figure 6
shows, the year-to-year movements in q and ROC correspond fairly well after
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1958. There is no evident relationship before then.
We conclude, therefore, that the decline in corporate real profitability
(ROC) over the last decade has not been matched by a corresponding decline
in the real opportunity cost of capital.- --
The evidence for MCs is less clear. The. "cost of capital" has been more
volatile; the relative rates of operating profitability and changes in
capitalization rates in explaining fluctuations in market values remain
more ambiguous.
The Absolute Value of q
As Table 2 shows, q has averaged somewhat less than 1.0 over the last
few years. One is tempted to conclude that NFCs and MCs are not earning
enough to cover the opportunity cost of capital (ROC = p). But any such
conclusion must be cautiously held. For one thing our standard base does
not include some assets. Although changes in q are, we believe, a reliable
signal of changes in ROC relative to p, the absolute value of q is a less
trustworthy statistic.
Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how the "true" value of q could
be much in excess of 1.0.
Where are the intangible assets, the growth opportunities, and the
monopoly rents? Apparently, in the last few years they have counted for
very littl when NFCs are examined in aggregate. We found this surprising.
Financial economists are accustomed to pointing out the assets that accounts
do not recognize--going-concern value, the fruits of past research and
development, product reputation, and so on. They have come to think of
growth firms as an important part of our economy. They believe that some
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firms have monopoly power. In each case they can cite firms as examples
to back up their beliefs. Yet these firms are evidently atypical. Judging
from q, there is little evidence that intangible assets, growth opportunities,
and monopoly rents have a significant impact on the current value of NFCs
or MCs although one or more of these effects must have been important
in the mid-1960s, and also in earlier periods, e.g. 1934-39.
IX. CONCLUSION
There is no question that NFCs have fared poorly since the mid-1960s.
The fact is obvious from the low real rates of return realized by investors
in NFCs. The poor performance is confirmed by declining operating profit-
ability over the same period.
Whether the most recent data are viewedoptimistically or pessimistically
depends on which past period is taken as normal. The evidence is that in the
mid-1960s the real profitability of NFCs was much higher, relative to the
opportunity cost of capital, than it is now. On the other hand, NFCs are
better off now than in the mid-1950s. Operating profitability (ROC) is about
the same now as then, but the cost of capital is lower. (If there is a capital
"shortage," it has as yet had no observable effect on the cost of capital.)
Over long periods--1947-79-- we have found no trend in the after-tax
rate of return on corporate assets.
In the last few years the aggregate market value of NFCs was at most
equal to the net replacement cost of all NFC assets. There was no evidence
that capital markets in recent years perceived NFCs as having, in aggregate,
substantial intangible assets or growth opportunities., The evidence we
have presented gives no basis for concluding that current or anticipated ROCs
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on NFC assets exceed the current opportunity cost of capital.
It seems reasonable to say that the real cost of capital for NFCs has
been about 6 to 7 percent since the late 1950s. The average long-run
real profitability of NFCs has also been 6 to 7 percent. In the period
from 1946 up to the late 1950s, the annual cost of capital was a volatile
series. Since then fluctuations in market value have been more closely
related to variations in profitability than to shifts in the cost of capital.
Further Research
The primary objective of our research to date has been to develop
measures of corporate profitability and capital costs that would permit
meaningful comparisons over time. Our research strategy has been to present
and discuss various measures of capital costs and profitability for the U.S.
Nonfinancial Corporation sectors and the Manufacturing Corporation subsector.
Many of our measures are rough; consequently we have restricted ourselves
to broad questions. On the basis of our results we are inclined to be
skeptical of trends or sudden permanent shifts in corporate profitability.
But we may have been forced to this position by the inadequacy of our
estimates, our limited understanding of the determinants of corporate profit-
ability over time, and the lack of a formal model explaining aggregate market
value in terms of operating income and other real variables.
Consequently we have an agenda for further research. We plan both
to improve our measures and fomralize the analysis undertaken in this paper.
Improved Measures
1. Currently we define corporate capital to cost of plant, equipment
and inventories. We need to augment net capital base to take
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account of additional assets employed in business--monetary assets
and land. This will entail an adjustment in operating income also.
The augmented capital stock would include cash and other assets on
which NFCs earned "imputed interest." Therfore in computing the
ROC on the augmented base, we should add monetary assets to the
denominator and imputed interest to the numerator.
2. Presently we measure the return to capital by profits and net
interest. However some capital is rented rather than owned, and
a portion of what is called the rental payment is really interest.
Capital whether rented or owned appears in the denominator of the
ROC. But the interest component of the rental payment does not.
To this degree our measure understates corporate. profitability.
Preliminary research suggests that this is not likely to be an
important source of error. But more careful study ia required
before we can say this with confidence.
Extending the Period of Analysis
The estimates in this paper run from 1947 through 1979. For MCs 1947
is as far back as the data currently available permit us to go. For NFCs
however, we can carry the estimates back to 1929. Preliminary work shows
extremely high q's for the 30s compared with the period following World War II.
Estimates for 1929-45 should be pursued more carefully. If the unusually
high q's for this period are real, we may have something important to say
about the macroeconomic history of that period.
Formalization
Aside from the section on "Searching for Trends," there is no formal
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statistical analysis in this paper. In particular we have not attempted to
specify or test a model linking real and financial variables.
There is a simple valuation model implicit in our conclusion that the
real cost of capital has been stable at about 6 percent for the last 20
years. We assumed market value equals current operating income capitalized
at the cost of capital. If this is true, then the cost of capital. equals
31/
current operating income divided by market value.-- We did not test this
model. When we do we will be forced to make changes and extensions, for
example:
1. We should in principle use expected future operating income. In-
vestors do not naively project current performance into the inde-
finite future. That means we must develop a proxy for expected
profitability.
2. We used the standard definition of operating income. Would other
definitions work better? The valuation model provides a basis for
testing which earnings series comes closest to true economic income
as perceived by investors. We think that we can show that the
standard definition, which is based on replacement cost accounting,
is more closely related to actual market values than income based
on historical cost accounts, even though the replacement.cost data
were not directly available to investors over the period we studied.
3. What about growth opportunities? Our measure of the cost of capital
is essentially an earnings price ratio, a mreasure well known to be
inadequate for growth firms. We should be able to develop a proxy
for growth opportunities based on q.
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FOOTNOTES
.. This report incorporates the research supported by the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology' s Project on International
Business, the Ford Foundation, the Sloan School of Management at
MIT, the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, and the Committee for
Economic Development. We are grateful to the sponsors for their
support and to Fischer Black, Jack Ciccolo, John Gorman, Everett
Hagen, Robert Merton, and Allen Sinai for their help in acquiring
necessary data and working out methodological issues. We thank
Eugene Fama and Nicholas Gonedes for a careful review of our
methodology and data, which we found very helpful. We are
especially indebted to Sudipto Bhattacharya, Robert Jarrow,
Richard Weiss, Bernard Horn, Peter Blanton and Douglas Swanson,
our research assistants at various times on this project, and
to Roger Hankin for permitting us to draw on his research on the
link between corporate profitability and inflation [11]. The
authors take full responsibility for errors, however.
2. The stock market's current valuation of growth firms like
Hewlett-Packard or Digital Equipment Corporation can only be
explained by the present value of profitable future invest-
ment opportunities. Current earnings are insufficient to
account for these firms' values, even if capitalized at high-
grade bond yields.
3. See, for example, Jensen's study of mutual fund performance
[15] and other evidence summarized by Fama [8].
4. For evidence, see Lorie and Hamilton [18],- Fama's review
article [8), and the articles collected in Lorie and Brealy
[17].
5. Earnings in this context are measured after taxes but before
interest, since our portfolio contains debt as well as equity
securities. Strictly speaking, we should subtract the present
value of future investment outlays from the present value of
the future earnings these outlays are expected to generate.
In short, we are using "earnings" loosely here.
6. P. can be expressed as a weighted average of returns to
creditors and stockholders.
Rt = Rt (D) MV (D) + Rt(E) MVE (1)
where Rt(D) = the rate of return earned in year t on a port-
folio of all the net outstanding debt of NFCs.
Rt(D) includes interest receipts and capital
gains or losses.
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MVt (D) = the market value of that debt portfolio at the
start of year t.
Rt(E) = the rate of return earned in year t on a port-
folio of all the equity shares of all NFCs.
Rt(E) includes both dividends and capital gains.
MVt(E) = the market value of that equity portfolio at
the start of year t.
MVt = the total market value of all NFC securities
(MVt(D) + MVt(E)) at the start of year t.
Thus Rt is the rate of return earned on a portfolio of all
securities issued by NFCs. It is the return to all bond-
and stockholders considered as a group.
7. Rt does not, however, measure the return earned by the govern-
ment via taxation. In a sense MVt understates the value to
society of NFCs, because it does not include the present
value of future taxes.
8. There is no reason for the relative past performance of
stocks and bonds to affect firms' future capital investment
decisions, for example.
9. Our procedures for estimating MVt follow those developed by
John Ciccolo in (5]. We are grateful for his assistance.
10. We are not implying that there are meaningful trends or cycles
in the rates of return shown in Table 1. It is not possible
to predict future Rts from the historical figures shown. No
investor standing at any point in the 1947-75 period could
have used the Rts observed up to the point to predict future Rts.
It is only hindsight that allows us to interpret the history of
rates of return.
11. CSt, the denominator of qt, is an average of starting and ending
values of NFC capital stock and inventories. Thus CS1 9 5 0 is a
simpie average of figures for the end of 1949 and the end of 1950.
.MVt is estimated as of mid-year -- the end of the second quarter
of year t. This convention facilitates. comparison to the rate of
return measures presented in Section III below. Unfortunately,
it also makes it difficult to match year-by-year fluctuations in
MV/CS and R, since R is based on market values computed at the
end of calendar years. We do not attach much significance to
any single year's value of MV/CS or R, however.
12. James Tobin has emphasized the importance of this ratio and
employed it in theoretical and empirical work. See, for
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19. [23], pp. 180-181.
20. [23], pp. 205-208.
21. We remind the reader that we are working with data that have
been extensively revised twice since Nordhaus' work, and
we have nine more years available.
22. Following Hankin [11] the equations were fitted by the Cochrane-
Orcutt iterative technique to adjust for a serious positive
auto-correlation of residuals.
23. Our conclusion rests on a larger statistical inquiry than the
one reproduced in the Tables. We tried other variables--per-
centage utilization of capacity and lagged inflation--as sub-
stitutes for and in combination with the two in Tables 4 and 5
and ended up with the same general result. See also the
additional notes on the regressions below.
24. We end up echoing Feldstein's and Summers' arguments, and
refer the reader to [9], pp. 217-24 for a more extensive dis-
cussion. Their analysis and statistical tests were helpful
in our work.
25. For a more rigorous verdict denying a declining trend see
Feldstein and Summers [9].
26. We believe Nordhaus is the only investigator who has attempted
to measure and compare trends in the rate of return and the
cost of capital. But his cost of capital measure is flawed
by (1) the use of book, rather than market values, for debt
and equity in his weighted average cost of capital measure;
(2) an inappropriate adjustment for the tax shield provided
by interest; (3) using a risk-free rate to measure the ex-
pected rate of return on corporate bonds; and (4) using the
earnings-price ratio for the expected market rate of return
on equity. (See [18], esp. p. 199.) Assumption (4), or
some equally simple rule of thumb, is perhaps unavoidable
when dealing with aggregate data. But the first three assump-
tions can be improved upon.
27. Modern financial theory shows that the market value of a firm
(MV) equals the capitalized value of the long-run average
earnings from assets now in place (Y/P), plus the present
value of growth opportunities (PVGO).
MV= + PVGO (2)
The capitalization rate P is the equilibrium expected rate of
return established in capital markets for this firm and
others of equivalent risk.
Earnings are equal to the return on capital times real cap-
ital (CS). Thus Y = ROC(CS), and
F-3
example, [27] and [29]. See also the 1977 Economic Report of
the President [7], pp. 28-29.
13. [7], p. 28.
14. Slippery issues are encountered as soon as one tries to speci-
fy exactly what assets should in principle go into the denomi-
nator of q. There is no reason for excluding assets just be-
cause they are intangible. But, as Fischer Black has pointed
out to us, all of MVt can in principle be traced to some
tangible or intangible asset. If so, the true value of q
equals 1.0 by definition.
But we would exclude one type of intangible asset from the
denorinator, namely the ability to earn rates of return in
excess of the opportunity cost of capital on investments
undertaken by the firm. In other words, we would not capit-
alize rents or quasi-rents and include them in the denomina-
tor. We concede the difficulty of distinguishing intangible
assets purchased by the firm from capitalized rents, but
still maint.ain that q is a useful index of corporate profit-
ability relative to the opportunity cost of capital.
15. This statement is strictly true only in a partial equilibrium
analysis.
16. We are indebted to John A. Gorman, Assistant to the Associate
Director -for National Income Accounts, for supplying revised
data prior to their publication in the Survey of Current
Business.
17. Remember that the ROCs shown in Table are intended as mea-
sures of real, not monetary, rates of return. They should
be compared to the Returns to Investors real rates of return in Table 1, and to
real, not nominal, interest rates.
18. See Hankin (11].
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MV = CS (v.) + PVGO (3)
PVGO is the present value of future opportunities to invest
at rates of return in excess of the cost of capital. Growth
is worth nothing if expected ROC on future investment just
equals p. If ROC = p now and for the future, the market
value of the firm just equals the value of its real capital.
Thus q, the ratio of MV to RC, depends on the ratio of ROC
to P:
MV ROC PVGO (4)
q = - - +CS p CS
where PVGO is a function of ROC/p and the rate of expansion
of real capital stock.
Now, by identifying changes in q with changes in ROC/p,, we
are actually assuming a constant expected long-term rate of
expansion in real capital stock. It is conceivable that q
could vary due to changes in the expected rate of investment,
even with ROC and p constant. But we consider this unlikely,
for two reasons. First, if ROC and p are constant, there is
no obvious mechanism to account for changes in the real in-
vestment rate. If the real rate of investment increases as
ROC/p increases, then that merely strengthens the relation-
ship between q and ROC/p. Second, Figures 4 and 6 below
show that recent fluctuations in MV can be largely accounted
for by changes in ROC.
28. We do not claim that this approach is without its own diffi-
culties. For example, there are problems in defining and
measuring real capital, and in estimating market values.
These problems are likely to be particularly severe in cross-
sectional comparisons. There is little meaning in comparing
the q's of the drug and steel industries, for example, since
so much of the drug industry's assets do not show on blance
sheets. (Comparisons of the industries' ROCs would be just
as suspect--perhaps more so.) At best one could make
rough adjustments such as capitalizing and amortizing adver-
tising and outlays on research and development. On the other
hand, biases in estimating CS or MV are not likely to be
volatile over time. Thus a change in q can be clearly inter-
preted even though the absolute value of the ratioccannot.
29. The ratio of operating earnings to MV is as close as we can
get to a direct estimate of the real cost of capital.p. In
principle we should estimate
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Myt(D)E)MV (Ept = Pt(D) ( MD))+ pt (E) t . (5)
Eq. (5) corresponds to Eq. (1) (fn. 6), except that the p's
are expected rates of return -- e.g., pt = E(Rt). Now, if
the total expected dollar return to debt and equity is just
equal to Yt i.e.,
PtMVt ~ pt(D)MVt(D) + pt(E)MVt(E) = Yt( 6)
then.pt = Yt/IVt, which is the ratio plotted in Figure 6.
Unfortunately, Eq. (6) makes a number of implicit assumptions.
For example, it holds only if growth opportunities are absent
(PVGO = 0) and if Yt equals investors' expectations of average
future earnings generated by assets held at t.
30. Remember that we have estimated P in real terms. The current
perception of high capital costs is based on nominal rates.
31. If MV = Y /pt, then P =Y /MV . Here p is the cost of
t . t t t t t t
capital, MVt market value, and Yt is current operating income.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATING OPERATING INCOME FOR
MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS
This appendix explains how we obtained before- and after-tax
operating incomes for manufacturing corporations. The goal was to
obtain figures comparable to those published in the National Income and
Product Accounts (NIPA) for all nonfinancial corporations (NFCs).
Therefore, we wanted income on an establishment basis--that is, income
attributed to manufacturing establishments, not manufacturing companies.
Manufacturing companies often have activities outside manufacturing. Also,
companies classified outside of manufacturing may do some manufacturing
on the side. Figures derived for establishments therefore reflect
manufacturing activity more purely. Capital stock figures for manufacturing
are for establishments.
We faced two major obstacles. First, many of the building blocks
for operating income are available only for manufacturing companies.
Second, no capital consumption adjustments were available for either
manufacturing companies or establishments.
Table Al summarizes how we circumvented these difficulties. Look
first at the left-hand column headed "Variable," which shows the figures
we need. We start with book (i.e., historical cost) income, after interest
but before taxes (BY). An inventory valuation adjustment (IVA) is
added to remove inventory profits. (Note: Positive inventory profits
imply a negative IVA.) Then a capital consumption adjustment (CCADJ)
is added to adjust for the excess of tax return historical.cost
depreciation over estimated economic depreciation. (Economic depreciation
is expressed in current dollars. When it exceeds tax return historical
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cost depreciation, as it has during most of the 1970s, CCADJ is negative.
Adding it reduces book income.) Next, interest (INT) is added back to
obtain before-tax operating income (YBT). -Finally, income taxes (TAX)
are subtracted to give after-tax operating income (YAT).
None of these variables is directly available for manufacturing
establishments. The figures that are available are not precisely the
ones we want. BY, IVA, INT and TAX are published for manufacturing
companies.
We now examine Table Al lirde by line.
1. The NIPA do give "profit-type return" for manufacturing
establishments. This figure includes inventory profits, and it covers
all manufacturing, not just corporations. However, book income
comparable to BY is given for non-corporate manufacturing.
Thus, we calculate BY by first reversing the inventory
valuation adjustment. That is, the IVA for all manufacturing is
subtracted, thus putting inventory profits back to "profit-type return."
Then the profit-type return for non-corporate manufacturing is
subtracted. The result is book income for corporate manufacturing
establishments.
2. IVA is given for manufacturing companies. We assumed the IVA for
establishments was the same proportion of book income before interest and
taxes,-i.e., to BY + INT, as for companies. Note that INT for
establishments is calculated in line (4).
3. The NIPA capital cost adjustment adjusts tax'return historical
cost depreciation in two ways:
a. To bring tax return depreciation allowances, which reflect
an accelerated pattern of writeoffs, into conformity with the
historical cost basis equivalent of economic depreciation.
b. To convert the historical cost equivalent of economic
depreciation to a replacement cost basis. The sum of (a) and
(b), therefore adjusts tax return depreciation to real economic
depreciation.
The adjustment under (a) is usually a subtraction from tax return
depreciation. The adjustment under (b) is usually an addition to
economic depreciation at historical cost. When (a) exceeds (b) as in
1967 (see our example below), the sign of the capital consumption
adjustment is positive; adding it back adjusts income for the excess of
tax return depreciation over "true" depreciation. When, as since 1974,
(b) exceeds (a) by a sufficient margin to make the sign of the capital
consumption adjustment negative, adding the capital consumption adjustment
corrects income for the excess of "true" depreciation over tax return
depreciation.
The NIPA contain no capital consumption adjustment for
manufacturing. We are only given the capital consumption allowance
(CCALL), which is historical cost depreciation from tax records. We
were forced to assume that the ratio of CCADJ to CCALL was the same for
manufacturing as for all NFCs. This is an extremely strong assumption.
4. Companies, not establishments, pay interest. However, we
allocated a fraction of company interest to establishments. The
fraction is based on book income after taxes but before interest
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(BY - TAX + INT) for companies and establishments. (The same ratio
was used later in estimating market values to allocate company dividends
to establishments.) Note that TAX is calculated in line (7).
5. YBT equals BY + IVA + CCADJ + INT.
6. A fraction of corporate taxes is allocated to establishments.
The fraction is based on taxable book income, that is BY, for
establishments and companies.
7. YAT equals YBT - TAX.
TABLE Al
Calculating Operating Income for Manufacturing
Corporations on an Establishment Basis
Symbol ProcedureaVariable
(1) Book income, after binterest but before taxb
(2). Plus: Inventory valuation
adjustmentb
(3) Plus: Capital consumption
adjustment
(4) Plus: Interestb
(5) Equals: Operating income
before tax
(6) Less: Tax b
(7) Equals: Operating
income after tax
BY
+ IVA =
+ CCADJ
Profit-type return for all - IVA for all
manufacturing (after interest, manufacturing
incorporating IVA but not
capital consumption adjustment)
- Profit-type
return for non-
corporate
manufacturing
IVA, company basis, for BY + interest (INT) from (4)
manufacturing corporations BY, company + interest,
basis company basis
= (Capital consumption allowance - CCALL, non-corporate
(CCALL), all manufacturing manufacturing
CCADJ for all NFCs
CCALL with CCADJ - CCADJ for.
for all NFCs all NFCs
+ INT Interest, company bais BY + INT - Tax from (5)
BY, company + INT, company -- Tax, company
basis 'basis basis
- YBT
- TAX
= YAT
BY + IVA + CCADJ + INT
Tax, company 13Y
basis BY, company basis
-- YBT - TAX
NOTES: a. All variables on establishment basis unless otherwise noted.
b. Directly available on a company basis.
TABLE A2
Calculating Operating Income--
Illustration Using Data for 1967
(Figures in Billions of $)
Variable
(1) BY
(2) IVA
(3) CCADJ
(4) INT
(5) YBT
(6) TAX
(7) YAT
Non-Financial
Corporations
55.2
Manufacturing Corporations
34.2
-1.6
4.0
8.7
66.3
27.7
38.6
-. 7
2.0
1.9
37.5c
14.5
= 35.2 - (-0.8) - 1.8
f34.2 + 1.9a
= -.8 (39.3 +.2.2 /
= (18.1 - 0.4) 38.94:04.0
2.2 (34.2 + 1.9 -2.239.3 + 2.2 - 14.5b16.6 /
= 16.6
23.0
From line
From line
Column does not add up exactly because -of rounding.
NOTES: a.
b.
C.
(4).
(6).
